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ABSTRACT 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent activity in the domain of 
personal jurisdiction, defendants have greater leverage to challenge 
the forum choices made by plaintiffs when initiating litigation.  This 
Article uncovers an unexpected way that defendants are deploying 
that leverage: by filing hybrid removals in federal court.  Hybrid 
removals are filed in cases that lack facial diversity of citizenship and 
involve no federal question.  Ordinarily, these characteristics would 
trigger a quick remand. To avoid that result, defendants have sought 
to make personal jurisdiction part of the removal analysis. This 
crossing of jurisdictional lines has the potential to facilitate 
expediency, but it may also undermine the relationship between 
federal and state courts.  For that reason, the Article concludes that 
hybrid removal should be embraced with due care, and offers some 
guidelines for its implementation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1945, the United States Supreme Court revolutionized personal jurisdiction 
with its decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.1  Dispensing with the rigid 
constraints that had governed for roughly 70 years,2 the Court embraced a new 
vision of the adjudicatory authority of states rooted in the now-familiar concept of 
“minimum contacts.”3  Now, roughly 70 years after International Shoe, a second 
personal jurisdiction revolution is underway.  This current revolution is softer than 
                                               
1 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
2 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
3 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
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the first – no longstanding precedent has been overturned, and the Court has 
instead strained to frame its decisions as mere extensions of established principles.4  
But revolutions take many forms, and as Part I of this Article explains, there can be 
little doubt that the Court’s recent cases have articulated narrowing principles that 
mark a substantial shift in both doctrine and tone.5 
For confirmation of this, one need only look to the trial courts.  Both plaintiffs 
and defendants have been making adjustments in litigation strategy in response to 
the Court’s activity, and trial judges have been faced with an influx of personal 
jurisdiction-related motions.  The remainder of this Article is focused on these 
adjustments and these motions in the context of aggregate litigation.  There is 
certainly much to be said about current developments in other forms of litigation,6 
but the basic case structure under consideration here involves claims – most often 
product liability claims – by multiple plaintiffs against one or more defendants.  
                                               
4 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1781 (“Our settled principles regarding 
specific jurisdiction control this case.”); id. at 1783 (“Our straightforward application in this case of settled 
principles of personal jurisdiction will not result in the parade of horribles that respondents conjure up.”). 
5 See infra Part I. 
6 As discussed infra at notes 20-21, a particular area for concern is the impact of   
 4 
Plaintiffs have long had substantial leeway in their selection of a forum for the 
litigation of these sorts of disputes.  They have used that leeway to achieve both 
horizontal and vertical objectives.  Horizontally, plaintiffs seek to identify states that 
may be hospitable to the claims being brought; vertically, plaintiffs often seek to 
secure a state court within that hospitable state by structuring the parties to the suit 
in a way that shields the case from removal.7   
The nascent personal jurisdiction revolution gives defendants powerful tools 
that can be employed to disrupt the ability of plaintiffs to achieve their objectives.  
Part II explains what those tools are, and how they are being used on the ground.  
In many cases, the forum selected by plaintiffs is insufficiently connected to at least 
some of the claims being asserted, and that permits defendants to force those 
claims to be litigated elsewhere.  When the plaintiffs are from multiple states, this 
connectedness problem may extend only to those claims brought by non-resident 
plaintiffs, and the victory for defendants is in that sense impartial.  But because the 
unconnected – and therefore jurisdictionally suspect – claims are often included in 
                                               
7 See infra notes 69-72. 
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the suit precisely to destroy diversity of citizenship among the parties, their 
elimination renders the remaining claims removable to federal court.  In this way, 
the personal jurisdiction revolution frustrates the plaintiffs’ vertical preferences and 
creates echoes in the domain of subject matter jurisdiction.  Whether these echoes 
were intended or anticipated is not clear, but they are nevertheless an 
understandable outgrowth of the new jurisdictional landscape.   
What is less understandable is the procedural route by which the defendants 
are seeking to achieve these results.  Rather than raise their personal jurisdiction 
arguments in state court, many defendants are opting instead to remove directly to 
federal court, notwithstanding a facial lack of diversity that would ordinarily provoke 
a remand. To avoid that outcome, defendants are asking the federal court to 
consider questions of personal jurisdiction first prior to assessing the viability of 
removal.  This Article labels this procedural strategy “hybrid removal” because it 
hinges on a consideration of personal jurisdiction arguments as part of the subject 
matter jurisdiction determination.  Hybrid removal deviates from the traditional 
federal analysis of removability, and its use is traceable directly to the personal 
 6 
jurisdiction revolution.  Part II tells the story of its introduction, early failures, and 
eventual success in the wake of Bristol-Myers Squibb.  Part III then offers a critical 
analysis of whether and when hybrid removal should be permitted.  Although there 
is no reason to impose a categorical bar, federal judges ought to approach the 
doctrine with care.  Personal jurisdiction determinations based on questions of 
federal law and limited to the pleadings are good candidates for hybrid removal; 
determinations requiring the development and assessment of jurisdictional facts or 
interpretations of state law are not.   
 
I. THE EVOLVING PERSONAL JURISDICTION LANDSCAPE 
Almost since the day the modern approach to personal jurisdiction was 
ushered in by the Supreme Court’s opinion in International Shoe, courts have 
distinguished between jurisdiction based on contacts related to the suit and 
jurisdiction based on aggregate contacts.8 The first category, now shorthanded as 
                                               
8 In addition to jurisdiction based on the “minimum contacts” formulation introduced in International Shoe, 
courts continue to recognize jurisdiction based on “traditional” grounds such as presence, consent, and domicile. 
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specific jurisdiction, supports jurisdiction only for particular claims and has been the 
subject of fairly sustained attention by the Supreme Court.9  Although litigated less 
frequently, the second category — general jurisdiction — remained a viable if less 
visible form of adjudicatory authority. 10  In particular, general jurisdiction proved 
useful in cases where a foreign defendant conducted substantial business activities 
within a state (or states). In such circumstances, a foreign defendant could be haled 
before an American court based on those activities, even when they bore no relation 
to the particular claims in the suit.  
                                                                                                                                                       
See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (physical presence in a state at the time they are served is 
consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice); Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 
(1991) (forum-selection clauses forcing individuals to consent to jurisdiction are enforceable); Milliken v. Meyer, 
311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) (individuals are subject to jurisdiction wherever they are domiciled).    
9 See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (mailing a reinsurance certificate established 
substantial connection enough for specific jurisdiction); World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 
(1980) (connection created by the unilateral activity of plaintiffs insufficient to make the exercise of jurisdiction 
reasonable); Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (contractual relationship, including forum selection 
clause, constituted purposeful availment sufficient to comport with notions of fair play and substantial justice).  
10 This form of jurisdiction was less visible in part because it did not seem to occur to defendants to mount a 
challenge. For example, even in Daimler, Mercedes Benz USA did not challenge the jurisdiction of the California 
court. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 757 (2014); see infra note 28.  Perhaps that is because they were 
content to defend there, but more likely they concluded that any such challenge would be futile. See Judy M. 
Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Goodbye Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG 
v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 111 (2015).  
 8 
Those days are over. In a pair of recent cases, the Supreme Court has now 
placed substantial limitations on the scope of general jurisdiction.11 Both of those 
cases arose in the transnational context just discussed. The first, Goodyear, involved 
a claim against a foreign subsidiary of Goodyear Tire and Rubber based on an 
accident that occurred in France.12 The injured parties were citizens of North Carolina 
and brought suit there. 13  There was no serious effort to articulate a specific 
jurisdiction theory, and the plaintiffs instead relied on an assertion that the 
subsidiary’s regular sales of products within the state provided authority for the 
exercise of general jurisdiction.14 That effort was rebuffed by a unanimous Court, 
which found that general jurisdiction was only appropriate where a defendant could 
be considered “at home,” and that the sort of business activity at issue did not meet 
                                               
11 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 
(2014). 
12 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918. 
13 Id.  
14 The Goodyear subsidiary did not directly sell tires in North Carolina, but tires did regularly make their way to 
the state through the “stream of commerce.” Id. at 926. 
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that high standard. 15 The Court followed that opinion with a very similar one in 
Daimler only three years later.16 At issue in Daimler were claims filed against a 
German corporation based on actions taken in Argentina that allegedly violated the 
human rights of foreign plaintiffs.17 The only connection between the suit and the 
California forum were the substantial sales of cars manufactured by the foreign 
defendant in that state.18 Again, the Court found that that kind of business activity, 
even if continuous and substantial, is insufficient to trigger the availability of general 
jurisdiction, and so the plaintiff’s unrelated claims were beyond the reach of the 
California courts.19  
                                               
15 Id. at 927. 
16 Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 746.  One difference between the two cases was that Daimler presented a question 
about whether the contacts of a subsidiary could be assigned to the principal for personal jurisdiction purposes.  
The Court declined to provide a definitive answer to that question.  See infra notes 26-28.   
17 Id. at 751. 
18  The Court mentions the underlying issue of whether a foreign corporation maybe be subject to general 
jurisdiction in the US based on the activities of its subsidiary, but declines to pass judgment. Id. at 759.  
19  Id. at 760.  
 10 
Unsurprisingly, the decisions in Goodyear and Daimler were immediately 
understood to have implications in the context of transnational litigation. 20 
Commentators predicted that it would be difficult to bring claims against foreign 
defendants in American courts unless the claims at issue arise out of (or at least 
relate to) activities taken in or producing effects in the United States.21 But the 
decisions also raised alarm bells for a second category of cases, namely those 
brought by multiple plaintiffs against a defendant or defendants based on a pattern 
                                               
20 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Daimler explicitly emphasizes the transnational context of the case. Id. at 762-63. 
See also Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, A Shifting Equilibrium: Personal Jurisdiction, 
Transnational Litigation, and the Problem of Nonparties, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 643 (2015); Gwynne L. Skinner, 
Expanding General Personal Jurisdiction Over Transnational Corporations for Federal Causes of Action, 121 PENN. 
ST. L. REV. 617 (2017); Aaron D. Simowitz, Legislating Transnational Jurisdiction, __ VA. J. INT’L. L. __ (forthcoming).   
21 See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2): A Way to (Partially) Clean Up 
the Personal Jurisdiction Mess, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 413, 415 n. 6 (2017) (complaining that the “retraction of 
corporate general jurisdiction” . . . “leave[s] many plaintiffs without any U.S. forum, even when foreign 
defendants injure plaintiffs in the United States and in so doing reap the benefits of the U.S. market”); Cassandra 
Burke Robertson & Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, The Business of Personal Jurisdiction, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775, 
786-88 (2017) (explaining that the inquiry as to what drives the Roberts Court’s approach to personal jurisdiction 
points to a reluctance to draw foreign disputes into United States courts and an overall commitment to 
formalistic notions of sovereignty dependent upon territorial boundaries).   Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior 
Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1789 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (predicting that 
the majority’s opinion will eliminate the ability to bring a mass action again a defendant not headquartered or 
incorporated in the U.S. since they are not “at home” in any state).  In response to these transnational litigation 
concerns, some have proposed expanding personal jurisdiction in the federal courts by shifting from Fourteenth 
Amendment due process to Fifth Amendment due process.  See Borchers, supra; Jonathan R. Nash, National 
Personal Jurisdiction (SSRN draft); Simowitz, supra note 20. 
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of conduct occurring in several states. 22  Flexible joinder rules often permit such 
claims to be brought together as a procedural matter, and jurisdiction in such cases 
largely went unchallenged when based on substantial business activities directed at 
the state. 23 But the restrictions on the use of such activities to support general 
jurisdiction raises questions about whether personal jurisdiction would undermine 
the goals of flexible joinder by requiring claims to be split, or alternatively, brought 
together in a forum inconvenient (and perhaps undesirable) to plaintiffs.24  
Since Daimler, plaintiffs have developed a variety of strategies to avoid its 
potentially harsh jurisdictional consequences.25 One such strategy is suggested by 
Daimler itself. There, the plaintiffs attempted to reach Daimler, a foreign corporation, 
                                               
22 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (concluding the majority’s opinion will make 
it difficult for plaintiffs in multiple states injured by a defendant’s nationwide conduct to sue in a single action); 
Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the 
Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 348 (2013). 
23 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 20; Cornett and Hoffheimer, supra note 10, at 111. 
24 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ( “the majority’s rule will make it difficult to 
aggregate the claims of plaintiffs across the country whose claims may be worth little alone,” resulting in 
piecemeal litigation and bifurcation of claims).  But see Alani Golanski, Why Daimler Accommodates Personal 
Jurisdiction in Mass Tort Litigations, 80 Alb. L. Rev. 311 (2017) (arguing pre-Bristol-Myers Squibb that Daimler 
“correlates with an expansive view of specific jurisdiction capable of accommodating the multiparty, multi-
jurisdictional mass tort scenario”). 
25  See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal 
Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 228-29 (2014). 
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through the contacts of its subsidiary, Mercedes Benz USA. 26  The Ninth Circuit 
explicitly embraced a theory of agency to support its conclusion that jurisdiction was 
proper, but the Supreme Court demurred. 27  According to Justice Ginsburg, the 
subsidiary’s contacts with California were insufficient to support general jurisdiction 
even if they were imputed to the parent corporation, and that finding made it 
unnecessary for the Court to articulate the circumstances under which jurisdictional 
agency might be permitted. 28  Technically, then, the issue of agency was left 
unresolved, but only because it was made irrelevant in most cases. The issue may 
reappear if a plaintiff attempts to reach a foreign defendant by suing in a 
subsidiary’s home state, but rather than demonstrating an exception, such a case will 
reflect the impact of Daimler’s rule. 
                                               
26 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 746. 
27 Id. at 759. 
28 This result was muddied by the fact that Mercedes Benz USA did not challenge jurisdiction, a litigation 
decision that almost certainly reflects the prevailing understanding that doing substantial business in the state 
was sufficient to expose a corporate defendant to jurisdiction.  See supra note 10.  That concession led Justice 
Ginsburg to conclude, “for purposes of this decision only, that MBUSA qualifies as at home in California.” 
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759.  Even so, she then determined that those same contacts were not enough to render 
Daimler itself at home in California. Id. Future subsidiaries are not likely to make the same concession. 
 13 
A second strategy has been to abandon the newly limited theory of general 
jurisdiction in favor of an expanded vision of specific jurisdiction.  This approach is a 
poor fit for many transnational cases,29 but it has substantial promise in the domain 
of aggregate litigation.  Or more accurately it had promise, until the Supreme Court 
decided Bristol Myers Squibb.30  BMS involved a classic aggregate litigation fact 
pattern.  Multiple plaintiffs joined together to sue the manufacturer of the drug 
Plavix.31  All of the claims involved harms that arose from the use of Plavix, but in 
only some of the claims did the allegedly harmful use occur in the forum state of 
California.32  For the California claims, no one disputed that there was a clear basis 
for the exercise of specific jurisdiction.33  BMS targeted California consumers with 
advertising in the state, distributed and sold the drug to patients within the state, 
                                               
29 For example, this approach would have failed in Daimler itself because there were no forum-linked activities 
by the defendant that were in any way related to the claims being brought.  Thus it was not possible to attempt 
an argument that the claims were “related to” forum activities, even absent a causal link.  In other words, the 
unrelated business activities were the only conceivable basis for jurisdiction, and the contraction of general 
jurisdiction was therefore decisive.   
30 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (holding that due process does not permit exercise of specific personal 
jurisdiction in California over claims by nonresident consumers).  
31 Id. at 1777. 
32 Id. at 1778. 
33 Id.  
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and the California claims arose directly from that purposeful activity.34 The difficulty 
in the case involved personal jurisdiction over BMS for the joined claims that were 
brought by non-California users of Plavix.35  One option would have been to use the 
continuous and systematic sales of the drug as a hook for general jurisdiction, but 
of course that was precisely the move targeted by Daimler. 36   With general 
jurisdiction off the table, the plaintiffs embraced a specific jurisdiction theory that 
hinged on the assertion that the non-California claims were nevertheless related to 
BMS’s activities within the state.37  In other words, the non-resident plaintiffs relied 
                                               
34 The California Supreme Court emphasized that BMS maintained a physical presence in California, employed 
well over 400 individuals in the state, and actively and purposefully sought to promote sales of Plavix to 
California residents, resulting in California sales of nearly $1 billion over six years.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 
Super. Ct., 377 P.3d 874, 886 (2016), rev'd by Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cty., 137 S. Ct. 
1773 (2017). 
35 The group of plaintiffs consisted of eighty-six California residents and 592 residents from thirty-three other 
states who filed eight separate complaints in California Superior Court. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1778.  
Although the complaints asserted thirteen claims arising solely under California law, the nonresident plaintiffs 
did not allege that they obtained the drug through any California sources, that they were injured by the drug in 
California, or that they were treated for their drug-related injuries in California. Id.  
36  Justice Ginsburg described use of the continuous and systematic formulation for general jurisdiction as 
“unacceptably grasping.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760–61.  
37 Brief for Respondent at 17-38 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017), 2017 WL 1207530; 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 377 P.3d at 888 (stating the claims were based not on “similar” conduct, 
but instead on a single, coordinated, nationwide course of conduct directed out of BMS's New York 
headquarters and New Jersey operations center and implemented by distributors and salespersons across the 
country).  
 15 
on the same purposeful conduct at issue in the California claims, and then linked 
that conduct to their own claims through a flexible view of the connection necessary 
to support specific jurisdiction.  That flexible view was good enough for the 
California Supreme Court,38 but was squarely rejected by an eight justice majority of 
the United States Supreme Court.39  According to the latter court, what is required is 
“a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue,” and that 
connection cannot be provided by claims brought by others.40  
In the wake of Bristol Myers Squibb, plaintiffs in aggregate products liability 
litigation have scrambled to comply with the requirement of a direct link between a 
defendant’s forum-state activity and each claim in the action.  Where the plaintiffs 
themselves live in different states, such that the sale, use, and harm allegedly caused 
by the product in question did not all occur in the forum state, plaintiffs have 
instead sought to find some other activity within the state that can be said to 
                                               
38 Id. 
39 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1776 (stating that the California Supreme Court found specific jurisdiction 
without identifying any adequate link between California and the nonresidents’ claims). 
40 Id. 
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contribute in some way to each claim.  This strategy first emerged in Bristol Myers 
Squibb itself, when the lawyers for the plaintiffs floated an alternative argument to 
support jurisdiction that relied on contractual activity between BMS and McKesson, a 
California corporation who contracted with BMS to distribute the drug nationally.41  
The Supreme Court dismissed that theory as a “last ditch contention,”42 but it has 
been picked up and fleshed out in subsequent cases, with mixed success.  Plaintiffs 
seeking to protect a major verdict in Missouri were unsuccessful in getting the court 
to permit additional “jurisdictional discovery” to develop evidence of forum activity 
common to all claims.43  But other plaintiffs have successfully brought claims by 
plaintiffs from multiple states in a consolidated action based on “clinical trials” or 
“field tests” that were conducted in the forum state.44 
                                               
41 Id. at 1783. 
42 Id. 
43 Fox v. Johnson & Johnson, 2017 WL 4629383 at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2017) (vacating a $72 million jury 
verdict, and declining to remand for additional jurisdictional discovery).  In a related case, a trial court judge in 
Missouri declared a mistrial in the immediate aftermath of Bristol-Myers Squibb.  
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202790568692/SCOTUS-Ruling-Instantly-Touches-Off-Mistrial-in-
Missouri-Talc-Cas/. 
44 The same Missouri trial judge who declared a mistrial after the Bristol-Myers Squibb decision later upheld a 
$110.5 million verdict based on a finding that personal jurisdiction was supported based on allegations that the 
 
 17 
A third strategy has been to search for federal statutory language that might 
be read to expand the scope of personal jurisdiction for certain claims.  For a time, 
certain provisions within the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) looked 
promising.  Section 56 of FELA provides that an action “may be brought” in the 
district “in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing 
[an] action.”45  Based on this language, plaintiffs argued that FELA claims could be 
brought in any federal district where a defendant was doing business, even if the 
                                                                                                                                                       
defendant enlisted a Missouri company to “manufacture, mislabel, and package” the product in question.  Slemp 
v. Johnson & Johnson, Nov. 29, 2017 Order at 7, No. 1422-CC09326-02 (Mo. Nov. 29, 2017).  See also M.M. ex 
rel. Meyers v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 61 N.E.3d 1026 (Ill. Ct. App. 2016) (finding specific jurisdiction based on 
defendant’s contracts with doctors within the state to conduct clinical trials on the drug in question).  Meyers 
was decided and the appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was denied before the United States Supreme Court 
decided Bristol Myers Squibb, but the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case after Bristol 
Myers Squibb.  GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. M.M. ex rel. Meyers, 138 S.Ct. 64 (October 2, 2017)(denying the petition 
for writ of certiorari).  See also In re Syngenta Mass Tort Actions,  No 3:16-cv-00255, 2017 WL 2117728 (S.D. Ill. 
May 15, 2017) (finding specific jurisdiction based on “field tests” conducted in Illinois). A similar argument was 
used in a single plaintiff case to support jurisdiction in a state that was the home of neither party. Dubose v. 
Bristol-Myers Squibb, No. 17-cv-00244, 2017 WL 2775034 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2017) (“clinical trials conducted [in 
California] were part of the unbroken chain of events leading to Plaintiff’s alleged injury”).  But after finding a 
valid basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, the court granted a motion to transfer the case to the 
plaintiff’s home state. Id. 
45 45 U.S.C. § 56 (2016). That same section also describes other districts where the action may be maintained. Id. 
Due to Supreme Court precedent, plaintiffs’ reliance on this section to approve personal jurisdiction over 
defendants seemed promising. As Judge Learned Hand explained in Kilpatrick v. Tex. and Pac. Ry., in both 
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner and Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., the Supreme Court held that once a 
railroad did business in any jurisdiction, Sec. 6 subjected it to personal service regardless of how much 
inconvenience or expense was involved in trying the action far away from the scene of the accident and the 
residence of all the defendant's witnesses; accordingly, a plaintiff might select a jurisdiction which promised “the 
richest harvest, and the railroad must meet him on his chosen ground.” 166 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1948).  
 18 
particular claim arose from business activity elsewhere.46  Moreover, the same section 
further declares that for FELA claims the jurisdiction of the federal courts “shall be 
concurrent with that of the courts of the several states.”47  According to plaintiffs, 
that meant that any FELA claim could also be brought in any state court within a 
federal district where the defendant was doing business. 48   As with the other 
strategies already discussed, success here was limited and short-lived.  Plaintiffs 
succeeded in convincing the Supreme Court of Montana to adopt their reading of 
FELA,49 but the United States Supreme Court stepped in once again to reject that 
effort. 50  According to the Court, the provisions relied on by the plaintiffs were 
                                               
46 See Brief for Respondent at 24, BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017) (No. 16-405), 2017 WL 1192088, 
at *24 (arguing that some statutes or cases using “concurrent” jurisdiction to refer only to subject-matter 
jurisdiction hardly establishes that “concurrent” jurisdiction is susceptible to only one meaning because a term 
“may mean one thing for one purpose and something different for another”) (quoting United States v. Memphis 
Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 68 (1933)).  
47 45 U.S.C. § 56 (2016). 
48 Additionally, this was even argued in jurisdictions where the defendant conducted only a small portion of 
business. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 67, State ex rel. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41 (Mo. 2017) 
(No. SC 95514), 2016 WL 3944143 (Mo.), at *67 (arguing that Daimler did not overrule decades of consistent U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent dictating that railroad employees may sue under FELA wherever the railroad is doing 
business). 
49 Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 373 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2016).  
50  BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S.Ct. 1549 (2017); see generally Civil Procedure – Personal Jurisdiction – BNSF 
Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 131 HARV. L. REV. 333 (2017).   Even before the United States Supreme Court answered the 
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directed at venue and subject matter jurisdiction, but had nothing to do with 
personal jurisdiction.51  Personal jurisdiction for FELA claims therefore must be based 
on standard due process principles, meaning that a connection between business 
activities and the claim must be present unless the defendant is sued “at home.”52 
 Finally, plaintiffs have argued that corporate defendants have consented to 
the exercise of jurisdiction through their compliance with state business registration 
requirements. This effort resuscitates a strategy used a century ago to resist narrow 
jurisdictional rules,53 but it has met with limited success.54  To be successful, plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                                                       
question definitively, other state supreme courts rejected the effort to read FELA to confer authority to exercise 
personal jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41 (Mo. 2017); Barrett v. Union Pac. R.R. 
Co., 390 P.3d 1031, 1038 (Ore. 2017) (explaining instead that the first sentence of section 56 provides for 
expanded venue “‘if there is jurisdiction’”). 
51 Tyrrell, 137 S.Ct. at 1555. 
52 And of course after Bristol Myers Squibb that connection requires more than that the activities are of the 
same kind that the defendant conducts within the state. See supra note 40. 
53 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (finding no substantial due process difference between requiring 
formal designation of local official for service of process and providing that use of highway is tantamount to 
such an appointment); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 
95 (1917) (finding consent to personal jurisdiction where an agent was appointed to accept service of process 
within forum state).  
54 E.g., Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 639 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he holding in Pennsylvania Fire 
cannot be divorced from the outdated jurisprudential assumptions of its era. The sweeping interpretation that a 
state court gave to a routine registration statute and an accompanying power of attorney that Pennsylvania Fire 
credited as a general “consent' has yielded to the doctrinal refinement reflected in Goodyear and Daimler and 
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must first convince the court that the applicable business registration statute was 
intended to trigger broad consent to jurisdiction, and then convince the court that 
such broad consent would be consistent with due process constraints. 55   A few 
courts have concluded that both of these hurdles have been cleared, thereby 
permitting the exercise of jurisdiction over claims unrelated to activities within the 
state against corporations not at home in the state.56  But a greater number of 
courts that have considered the issue recently have stopped short of that 
                                                                                                                                                       
the [Supreme] Court's 21st century approach to general and specific jurisdiction in light of expectations created 
by the continuing expansion of interstate and global business.”). 
55 Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, a party may consent to personal jurisdiction and thus waive protection of 
the Due Process Clause. Ins. Corp. of Ire., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) 
(explaining that personal jurisdiction is waivable because it flows from the Due Process Clause and protects an 
individual liberty interest). But there may be limits on the scope of consent that a state can extract in exchange 
for registration to do business. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in 
a Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 436 (2012) (considering this question); Tanya J. Monestier, 
Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1364-65 (2015) . 
56 Specifically, courts in the Third and Fourth Circuits have declined to interpret Daimler as creating a sea change 
regarding personal jurisdiction by consent. Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2016) 
(holding that a foreign corporation registered to do business in Pennsylvania thereby consented to exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over it in Pennsylvania in a products liability action); Hegna v. Smitty's Supply, Inc., No. 16-
3613, 2017 WL 2563231, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2017) (concluding that by registering to do business under § 
5301, the corporation consented to general personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania and that its consent is still valid 
under Goodyear and Daimler); Kukich v. Electrolux Home Prod., Inc., No. ELH-16-3412, 2017 WL 345856, at *6 (D. 
Md. Jan. 24, 2017) (finding the foreign corporation consented to general jurisdiction in the state by registration).  
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conclusion.57  In part this is attributable to the different language contained in the 
registration statutes being interpreted. That said, many courts have openly worried 
that expansive interpretations of registration requirements would chart an end run 
around the limitations imposed by Daimler, 58  and for that reason have favored 
narrower constructions that avoid due process concerns.59  Ultimately the Supreme 
                                               
57 Since Daimler did not fully address the issue of jurisdiction through consent, many courts subsequently 
followed the foundation laid by Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp. 814 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2016) (concluding that the 
Connecticut business registration statute does not constitute a corporation's consent to submit to the general 
personal jurisdiction of Connecticut courts). See, e.g., Perez v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. 3:16-CV-00842-NJR-
DGW, 2016 WL 7049153, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2016) (finding that the corporation did not consent to jurisdiction 
by registering to do business and appointing an agent for service of process, as required by Illinois law to do 
business in the state); Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 188 F. Supp. 3d 734, 748-50 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (rejecting 
plaintiffs' argument that the court should exercise general personal jurisdiction because banks consented to 
jurisdiction by registering to do business in Illinois); In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., No. 14-md-2591-
JWL, 2016 WL 2866166, at *5 (D. Kan. May 17, 2016) (holding that jurisdiction-via-registration violates the 
Dormant Commerce Clause); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec 137 A.3d 123 (Del. 2016) (holding that a foreign 
corporation's compliance with statutory requirements for registration of a foreign corporation to 
do business within a state does not constitute implied consent to general jurisdiction over corporation within 
that state); State ex rel. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Dolan 512 S.W.3d 41 (Mo. 2017) (holding that statutes governing 
registration of foreign corporations and service thereon do not provide an independent basis for exercising 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations for suits unrelated to the corporation's activities in the state). Many courts 
that have considered the issue have concluded that the statutes in question were directed at ensuring the 
availability of service rather than expanding the scope of the state’s jurisdictional authority.   
58 See, e.g., Brown, 814 F.3d at 639 (“[W]ere we to accept Brown’s interpretation of Connecticut’s business 
registration statute, we would risk unravelling the jurisdictional structure envisioned in Daimler and Goodyear 
based only on a slender inference of consent pulled from routine bureaucratic measures that were largely 
designed for another purpose entirely.”); Cepec, 137 A.3d at 140-48. 
59 See Brown, 814 F.3d at 639; Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec 137 A.3d at 139 (explaining that the decision aligned 
with current federal rules on jurisdiction by giving the statute “a narrower and constitutionally unproblematic 
reading”).   
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Court will likely have to resolve the limits (if any) on a consent-based theory rooted 
in a state’s business registration statute.60 Given the Court’s reaction to other efforts 
to avoid the impact of Daimler, there is reason to believe that the success enjoyed 
by plaintiffs here may not only be limited but also short-lived. 
  
II. LITIGATION TRENDS 
 There may yet prove to be a route that plaintiffs can forge to avoid or at least 
mitigate the impact of the Supreme Court’s recent activity in the domain of personal 
jurisdiction. Until then, it appears that these decisions provide a powerful tool to 
defendants involved in aggregate litigation. This article now turns to the ways that 
defendants are using that tool.  Specifically, the discussion here explores the specific 
procedural mechanisms by which the newly recognized jurisdictional restrictions are 
being introduced into litigation in the federal and state courts.  Although attention 
is paid to a variety of litigation trends that have emerged in recent years, the focus 
                                               
60 Rhodes, supra note 55, at 436 (noting that registration-based jurisdiction is “ripe for invalidation by the 
Supreme Court”); Monestier, supra note 55, at 1398-1400. 
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of this section – and indeed the remainder of the Article – will turn to one trend in 
particular:  hybrid removal.    
 
A. Cases Filed in Federal Court 
If a case is filed in federal court, as a general matter the due process 
constraints on personal jurisdiction articulated by the Daimler series of cases will be 
applicable thanks to the command of the federal procedural rules.61 As a result, 
defendants served with a federal summons today can respond with a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) if their only contact with the state where the federal 
court sits is unrelated business activity. 62  Depending on the circumstances, this 
motion may be targeted at the entire suit or at certain claims within it.  
                                               
61 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Two exceptions to this are found in Rule 4(k). In cases involving joinder under Rule 14 
or 19, service “not more than 100 miles from where the summons was issued” is sufficient to establish personal 
jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(B). For federal claims, jurisdiction can be supported based on nationwide 
contacts, so long as the defendant would not be subject to personal jurisdiction in any individual state and 
“exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). 
62 This is true notwithstanding the fact that state long arm statutes may purport to reach the defendant. See, 
e.g., DE ST TI 10 § 3104(c)(4)(permitting exercise of jurisdiction over defendants who cause tortious injury out of 
the state if the person does regular business in the state or engages in other persistent course of conduct); MS 
ST § 13-3-57 (2003)(allowing state to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants who do any business in the 
state); NE ST § 25-536 (2003)(1)(d) (stating the court can exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants if they 
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If the defendant is foreign and the claim arises from activities outside the 
United States, a full dismissal may be granted and the practical result will be to force 
the litigation to relocate outside of the American system.63 If the defendant is not 
foreign or if the claim arose from activities that occurred elsewhere within the 
United States, then a full dismissal would have the effect of forcing the litigation to 
relocate within the American system, either where the defendant is at home or in a 
state where specific jurisdiction over all claims can be supported.64 The federal court 
                                                                                                                                                       
cause injury in the state by acts outside of the state if they regularly do business or engage in other persistent 
conduct within the state); NC ST § 1-75.4 (2002)(d) (authorizing exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants 
whether the claim arises in the state or without the state if defendants are engaged in substantial activity within 
this State, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise); ORCP 4 (2002)(d) (granting exercise 
of personal jurisdiction over defendants whether the claim arises within the state or without this state if the 
defendant is engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within this state, whether such activities are 
wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise); WI ST § 801.05 (2003) (granting exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
defendants whether the claim arises within the state or without this state if the defendant s engaged in 
substantial and not isolated activities within this state, whether such activities are wholly interstate, intrastate, or 
otherwise). 
63  Daimler did not lead to full dismissal because Mercedes Benz USA consented to jurisdiction. Daimler, 134 
S.Ct. at 746. If only Daimler had been sued, then there would have been no American jurisdiction where the case 
could have been sustained. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting)(arguing the majority’s opinion will make it impossible for plaintiffs to bring nationwide actions 
against foreign corporations who are not “at home” in any state, curtailing and even eliminating their ability to 
hold corporations accountable). 
64 See discussion supra notes 21-24. 
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may achieve this result more efficiently by granting a transfer of the case rather than 
ordering a dismissal.65  
In many cases, Daimler threatens only a subset of the claims within a case, 
and so a motion to dismiss will not achieve complete dismissal for the defendant. 
This was true of Daimler itself, thanks to the fact that one of the defendants 
consented to jurisdiction.66  It is also true of many aggregate litigation cases with a 
structure similar to Bristol-Myers Squibb. The claims that arise from in-state activity 
are jurisdictionally secure, but other claims may be targeted by a motion to dismiss 
even if they are sufficiently related for joinder purposes and arise from activity 
identical to that used to support the in-state claims.67 Should a defendant decide to 
deploy the jurisdictional defense supplied by the Daimler line of cases, the result will 
                                               
65 See, e.g., Dubose v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 2017 WL 2775034, *5 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2017)(finding personal 
jurisdiction based on defendant conduct in the state but transferring to the plaintiff’s home state).  And of 
course it is well established that a federal court may transfer even if it concludes that it lacks personal 
jurisdiction. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 82 S.Ct 913, 916 (1962). 
66 Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 746. 
67 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1783 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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be to force the plaintiff to choose between pursuing a single case in the defendant’s 
home state or pursuing a fractured case in multiple states. 
 
B. Cases Filed in State Court  
The impact of Daimler is more complex in cases filed in state court. At a 
superficial level, the state court location of the suit makes no difference, at least in 
cases that would fall within the scope of federal rule 4(k)(1)(A). In those cases, the 
procedural device used to raise a jurisdictional challenge may vary based on state 
practice, but the availability of a jurisdictional defense would be identical in either 
court system. So again, defendants in state court today may use Daimler to seek 
dismissal either of the entire case or of some subset of claims within a case.68  
The complexity arises because the resolution of the personal jurisdiction 
issues may have implications for federal subject matter jurisdiction. It is no secret 
                                               
68  Daimler, 134 S.Ct 746, and Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. 1773, are examples of partial dismissals.  For an 
example of a complete dismissal, see Swann, et al. v. Johnson & Johnson, et al., No. 1422-CC09326-01 (Mo. June 
21, 2017).  Almost immediately after Bristol-Myers Squibb was decided, a state court judge in St. Louis declared 
a mistrial in an ongoing trial involving an alleged link between talcum powder and ovarian cancer.   
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that many plaintiffs bringing tort actions prefer to litigate in state court.69 Indeed, 
when structuring cases, plaintiffs often strive to secure that preferred forum by 
shielding the suit from removal.  Sometimes this is done by foregoing federal claims 
that might otherwise be brought.70 In many other cases, it is done by destroying 
complete diversity through the strategic inclusion of plaintiffs who are citizens of the 
defendant’s home state.71 Defendants have long resisted this strategy, with limited 
success.72 That track record should change under the new regime. In many cases, 
                                               
69 See, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, The Business of Personal Jurisdiction, 67 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775, 786 (2017) (discussing how forum shopping is based on the premise that justice may 
vary on the vagaries of geography unrelated to the merits of the claim at hand); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore 
Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal 
Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593 (1998) (finding that, after controlling for other variables such as case 
selection, removal to federal court decreased plaintiffs' odds of winning by roughly one-fifth); Paul Rosenthal, 
Improper Joinder: Confronting Plaintiffs' Attempts To Destroy Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 59 AM. U. L. 
REV. 49, 57 (2009) (“Forum selection is often the most important strategic decision a party makes in a lawsuit.”). 
70 See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1986) (noting that a plaintiff is “the master of the 
claim” and may choose to avoid removal by omitting federal claims from the initial complaint). 
71  A recent article, which characterizes this strategic case structuring as “fraudulent aggregation,” provides many 
recent examples. Jeff Lingwall and Chris Wray, Fraudulent Aggregation: The Effect of Daimler and Walden on 
Mass Litigation, 69 FLA. L. REV. 599, 600 n. 4 (2017). Because this destroys diversity, the action is not removable 
under 28 U.S.C. §1441(a). 
72 The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which was designed to facilitate the relocation of some class actions to 
a federal forum, is an example of substantial success on a systemic level.  But CAFA has had unintended 
consequences that have mitigated much of its forum effects.  Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions Shrugged: Mass 
Actions and the Future of Aggregate Litigation, 32 REV. LITIG. 591, 593 (2013) (“CAFA has inspired some of the 
most creative lawyering in recent decades, as plaintiffs' attorneys seek to evade CAFA class and mass action 
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defendants should now have the tools necessary to target the claims by non-diverse 
plaintiffs, and then remove the remaining claims to federal court. In other words, the 
Supreme Court’s recent activity should be expected to have both horizontal and 
vertical effects. It will lead to relocation of suits from one state to another, but it will 
also lead to relocation of suits from state court to federal court.73 
To see how this may play out, consider a slight simplification of Bristol Myers 
Squibb.74 Ten years ago, if some California users of Plavix decided to sue Bristol 
Myers Squibb, and had a strong preference to do so in a state court in California, 
then they would likely consider joining forces with some other Plavix users from 
either New York (where BMS’s headquarters are located) or Delaware (where BMS is 
                                                                                                                                                       
provisions and to retain aggregate litigation in state court forums.”).  At the individual case level, defendants 
have been forced to resort to arguments like fraudulent joinder, which are rarely successful.  See infra Part III.A.  
This limited success in the courts has triggered efforts to forge a legislative solution, which have thus far led 
nowhere.  See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, The “Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016”: A New Standard and a 
New Rationale for an Old Doctrine, 17 THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY REVIEW 34 (2016). 
73 Lingwall & Wray, supra note 71, at 602-03. 
74 This hypothetical leaves out the “last ditch contention” from that the decision by the defendant to contract 
with a forum-based company to distribute the drug nationally created a sufficient link to support specific 
jurisdiction. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1783; see supra notes 43-44.   
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incorporated). 75   California’s joinder rules would permit the claims to proceed 
together as a matter of procedure, and personal jurisdiction would be supported by 
BMS’s substantial business activity (and sales of Plavix) within the state of 
California.76 The array of parties would also prevent removal, at least if the plaintiffs 
limited their complaint to state law causes of action, 77 and thus the plaintiffs could 
rather easily structure their complaint to achieve their objectives.  Today, that effort 
would fail. Daimler and BMS in combination make it clear that the California court 
could not exercise jurisdiction over the out of state defendants, and once those 
parties are dismissed, the remaining parties satisfy the federal subject matter 
                                               
75 Under 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1), a corporate party is deemed a citizen of “every State and foreign state by which it 
has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.”  The 
“principal place of business” language has been interpreted to refer to the corporation’s “nerve center,” which 
usually coincides with the location of its headquarters.  Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010). 
76 See Brief for Respondent at 11, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-
466), 2016 WL 7156384 at *11 (explaining that California had routinely exercised jurisdiction based on business 
activity within the state).  
77 The presence of federal claims would raise the possibility that the case would fall within the scope of federal 
subject matter jurisdiction through some combination of original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1367.  
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jurisdiction requirement of complete diversity.  As a result, the surviving portion of 
the case may be heard in a federal court.78  
As a procedural matter, how should a defendant go about achieving this 
result?  The most straightforward answer is that a defendant should proceed in two 
steps.  First, the defendant should file a motion to dismiss based on personal 
jurisdiction in the state court where the plaintiffs filed the action.  When that motion 
is resolved, and the claims by the out of state (and non-diverse) plaintiffs are 
dismissed, what remains is a removable case.  The second step, therefore, is to take 
advantage of the 30-day statutory window to file a notice of removal when changes 
to a case render it removable.79  Consider again the California plaintiffs who join 
                                               
78 The prospect of removal will affect how plaintiffs respond to the sub-optimal choices provided them under 
the new regime. Think again about the modified BMS case. Today, the plaintiffs will have two choices from the 
standpoint of personal jurisdiction: bring the claims together in the defendant’s home state using a general 
jurisdiction theory, or split the claims and rely on specific jurisdiction to bring the claims in multiple states. One 
way to view this choice is as a trade-off between the inconvenience of litigating on the defendant’s home turf 
and the inefficiency of piecemeal litigation. But that misses the vertical implications of the Daimler line of cases. 
If the plaintiffs split the claims, the result will not just be inefficiency, but a shift to a federal venue for many 
(though not all) of the claims. That result can be avoided if the plaintiffs choose instead to accept the 
inconvenience of litigating in the defendant’s home state. Put differently, if we observe plaintiffs traveling 
together post-Daimler to sue defendants at home, that could reflect either a desire to maximize litigation 
efficiency or the strength of the plaintiffs’ preference for litigation in state court. 
79 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (“Except as provided in subsection (c), if the case stated by the initial pleading is not 
removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or 
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forces with a New Yorker to sue Bristol-Myers Squibb in a California state court. The 
defendant’s strategy would be to file a motion to dismiss the claim by the New York 
plaintiff, and after Daimler and Bristol-Myers Squibb there is little doubt that such a 
motion would be granted.  When the case is thus reduced to claims by California 
plaintiffs against a corporation headquartered in New York and incorporated in 
Delaware, BMS can relocate the case to federal court with an uncomplicated notice 
of removal. 
Interestingly, many defendants navigating the post-Daimler terrain have opted 
not to chart this straightforward path.  Instead, they have skipped the step of 
presenting a personal jurisdiction challenge to the state court in favor of filing an 
immediate notice of removal in federal court.80  When the plaintiffs respond to the 
removal with a motion to remand, the defendants urge the federal court to dismiss 
certain claims based on personal jurisdiction, and then uphold the removal of the 
claims that remain.  This approach asks the federal court to assess personal 
                                                                                                                                                       
otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascer-
tained that the case is one which is or has become removable.”) 
80 See, e.g., cases discussed infra at notes 88-100. 
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jurisdiction as part of its consideration of subject matter jurisdiction, and because it 
blends those two doctrines it will be referred to here as “hybrid removal.”  On a 
superficial level, hybrid removal appears to be a more expedient manner of 
proceeding as it involves one step rather than two. But in fact this approach 
introduces greater complexity because it raises questions about the sequencing of 
jurisdictional decisions and about judicial federalism that are avoided by the two-
step approach.  
When deciding whether a case has been properly removed, the default 
position for federal judges is to consider the case as it has been presented to them 
through the attached state court materials.81 This default position is problematic for 
defendants pursuing hybrid removal. Absent a favorable resolution of such a 
personal jurisdiction challenge in state court, the materials presented to the federal 
court show a case that does not meet the requirements for removal, and the 
ordinary result is a remand to state court. To avoid this outcome, defendants need 
                                               
81  14B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3723 n. 12; Pullman Co. v. 
Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537-38 (1939) (right to remove should be “determined according to the plaintiffs’ pleading 
at the time of the petition for removal”).  
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an argument to nudge federal judges away from the default position, and they have 
found an attractive candidate in Ruhrgas v. Marathon Oil.82 In Ruhrgas, the Supreme 
Court considered whether a federal court could dismiss a removed case on personal 
jurisdiction grounds without first establishing a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. 
A unanimous Court answered in the affirmative, at least where the personal 
jurisdiction issue is “straightforward” and “presents no complex question of state 
law.” 83  Defendants have seized on Ruhrgas to argue that because the personal 
jurisdiction issues presented post-Daimler are indeed straightforward, federal courts 
need not consider the viability of removal based on the case as presented to them.  
Instead, the court should dismiss certain claims from the action based on personal 
jurisdiction before assessing whether the requirements for removal are satisfied.84 
Thus, defendants achieve their goals — dismissal of some claims and relocation of 
the others to federal court — in one fell swoop.  
                                               
82 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999).  As discussed infra Part III.A, some defendants have 
relied on the doctrine of procedural misjoinder to achieve a similar result.   
83 Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 588 (1999).  See also id. at 578 (there is no “unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy”). 
84 See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 37, Robinson v. Pfizer, Inc., 855 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-2524), 2016 WL 
7228481, at *37.  
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Notwithstanding the appeal of this approach, it is not without its difficulties. 
Primary among them is that even if Ruhrgas does apply, it operates as a source of 
discretion rather than as a command. That means that defendants need to convince 
federal judges not only that they can consider personal jurisdiction before assessing 
removal, but also that they should. This initially proved challenging, even after 
Daimler. As a pragmatic matter, the jurisdictional sequencing approved by Ruhrgas 
is enticing to federal judges because it promotes the expedient resolution of cases. 
Rather than engage in a complex analysis of whether the case must be dismissed for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court can reach the same result by 
recognizing a straightforward defect in personal jurisdiction. But the invocation of 
Ruhrgas in a hybrid removal scenario does not simplify matters in the same way. In 
part this is because the alternative that is being avoided is itself straightforward. If 
the court takes up subject matter jurisdiction first, it looks at the removal materials 
and sees a case that lacks complete diversity on its face. True, the court may have to 
consider an argument sounding in something like fraudulent joinder along the way, 
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but even so the path to remand is fairly smooth. 85  So a decision to consider 
personal jurisdiction first does not help the court avoid complexity, particularly since 
the personal jurisdiction issues might require the court to consider issues of first 
impression. Just as important, a decision to consider personal jurisdiction first does 
not provide the court with an alternative path to dismissal. Quite to the contrary, 
defendants are pressing hybrid removals precisely because they are trying to steer 
the court to a different result, one that would add a complex case (or part of one) 
to the docket.  
Despite the hurdles associated with the hybrid removal strategy, defendants 
began to pursue it in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler.  
This was no accident, but was instead the result of a concerted effort by defendants 
to leverage the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence to manipulate 
venue in their favor.86 At first, the overwhelming reaction of federal judges faced 
                                               
85 See, e.g., Dotson v. Bayer Corp., 2017 WL 35706 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 4, 2017) (considering and rejecting fraudulent 
misjoinder and fraudulent joinder before remanding).  Many of the cases cited supra note 89 are very similar in 
their reasoning and result. 
86 Richard A. Dean and Jennifer L. Mesko, How to Remove Multi-Plaintiff Cases Involving Personal Jurisdiction 
Challenges and Avoid Subject Matter Remand, RX for the Defense, Vol. 23 Issue 2 (Defense Research Institute 
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with hybrid removals was to dispatch the cases quickly back to state court. 87  
Notwithstanding these early failures, defendants continued to press hybrid removal, 
and indeed continued doing so even after receiving clear instructions to stop.88  As 
but one example, consider the experience of Bayer in the Eastern District of 
Missouri.  Bayer and a number of its subsidiaries have been subject to multiple 
                                                                                                                                                       
Mar. 26, 2015) (“It is well known that Daimler provides a powerful tool for defendants to attack claims of 
personal jurisdiction.  But the novel combination of the Daimler personal-jurisdiction argument with the Ruhrgas 
approach to the ‘hierarchy of jursidiction’ question provides an even more powerful removal option for multi-
plaintiff cases filed in state court.”); see also Sherri S. Rich, The Yielding Jurisdictional Hierarchy, 51 Federal 
Lawyer 34 (Aug. 2004).  
87 See, e.g., cases cited infra note 89.  The only exception to this early trend of remands is Addelson v. Sanofi 
S.A., 2016 WL 6216124 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 25, 2016) (approving hybrid removal and issuing stay pending transfer to  
multidistrict litigation). 
88 As an interesting illustration, consider Robinson v. Pfizer, Inc., 2016 WL 1721143, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2016).  
Sixty-four plaintiffs from twenty-nine states joined together to file a complaint against Pfizer in the Circuit Court 
for the City of St. Louis, Missouri.  Notwithstanding the fact that six plaintiffs shared New York citizenship with 
the defendant, Pfizer filed a notice of removal.  In the district court, the defendants raised the issue of hybrid 
removal, but the district court’s opinion relied primarily instead on arguments sounding in fraudulent joinder 
and procedural misjoinder.  On the basis of those arguments, the district judge not only issued a remand order, 
but also entertained and granted a request by plaintiffs for attorneys’ fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c).  In 
doing so, the district judge noted the numerous efforts by defendants to seek removal in similar cases, and 
concluded that those efforts were no longer “objectively reasonable.” That cost order triggered something 
relatively uncommon in this area:  appellate review.  A remand by a district judge is a non-appealable order, 28 
U.S.C. 1447(d), but the order imposing costs was subject to appeal.  Because the costs order should not have 
been imposed if the removal was objectively reasonable, the appeal in Robinson opened the window to present 
the issue of hybrid removal to the Eighth Circuit. See Brief for Appellant at 37-39, Robinson v. Pfizer, 855 F.3d 
893 (8th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-2524), 2016 WL 4728015 at *37-39.  In response, the plaintiffs disclaimed the costs 
awarded and argued that the appeal was therefore moot.  Brief for Appellees at 12-16, Robinson v. Pfizer, 855 
F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-2524), 2016 WL 6679969 at *12-16.  The Eighth Circuit accepted the mootness 
argument, and therefore made no statement regarding the propriety of hybrid removal.  Robinson v. Pfizer, 855 
F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2017).    
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lawsuits surrounding the Essure birth control device, and many of those lawsuits 
have been filed in the state courts of Missouri.  In most of those cases, the claims 
brought by some of the plaintiffs were unrelated to any activity undertaken by Bayer 
within the state.  In turn, some of the plaintiffs asserting these unrelated claims 
shared citizenship with at least one of the defendants, thereby destroying complete 
diversity.  At least since Daimler was decided, Bayer has consistently responded to 
these lawsuits by filing a notice of removal, invoking Ruhrgas in an effort to get the 
federal court to consider personal jurisdiction first, and arguing that dismissal of the 
unrelated claims creates a valid basis for removal.  The first fifteen times it did so, a 
variety of federal judges rebuffed Bayer’s efforts and instead issued quick and 
unreviewable remands back to state court.89   
                                               
89 McPeters v. Bayer, Corp., No. 4:16-CV- 1680-SPM, 2017 WL 57250 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 5, 2017); Mounce v. Bayer, 
Corp., No. 4:16CV1478 RLW, 2017 WL 7235707 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 2016); Hines v. Bayer Corp., No. 4:17-CV-
01395-JAR, 2017 WL 2535709 (E.D. Mo. June 12, 2017); Dotson v. Bayer Corp., No. 4:16cv01593PL, 2017 WL 
35706 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 4, 2017); Langston v. Bayer Corp., No. 4:17–CV–00888 JAR, 2017 WL 1873285 (E.D. Mo. May 
9, 2017); Jordan v. Bayer Corp., No. 4:17–CV–01330–JAR, 2017 WL 1909059 (E.D. Mo. May 10, 2017); Hall v. Bayer 
Corp., No. 4:16–CV–1523 (CEJ), 2017 WL 86011 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2017); Dorman v. Bayer Corp., 4:16CV601 HEA, 
2017 WL 7033765 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2016); Robb v. Bayer Corp., No. 4:16–CV–1727–RLW, 2017 WL 7235708 (E.D. 
Mo. Dec. 13, 2016); Tenny v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC., No. 4:16-CV-1189-RLW, 2017 WL 7235705 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 
2016); Jones v. Bayer Corp., No. 4:16CV1192 JCH, 2017 WL 7230433 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 14, 2016); Whitlock v. Bayer 
Corp., No. 4:16–CV–1913–SPM, 2017 WL 564489 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2017). 
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Eventually, though, Bayer’s persistence paid off.  On July, 14, 2017, the 
sixteenth time proved the charm and Bayer achieved precisely the result it sought.90  
Other defendants litigating in the Eastern District of Missouri have similarly seen 
their luck change.  Hybrid removals have now been accepted in numerous cases, by 
multiple judges in the district.91  So what changed?  As previously discussed, the 
decision whether to engage in jurisdictional resequencing is influenced by pragmatic 
considerations, and those considerations have been shifting in favor of permitting 
hybrid removal.  When the Supreme Court decided Goodyear and then Daimler, it 
marked a clear shift in the doctrine of general jurisdiction.  Even so, as detailed in 
Part II, many doctrinal ambiguities remained, particularly around the potential for an 
                                               
90 Jordan v. Bayer, 2017 WL 3006993 (invoking Ruhrgas, dismissing unrelated claims based on lack of personal 
jurisdiction, and denying the motion to remand as to the remaining claims). For further discussion of this case, 
see infra notes 136-153.  Notably, Bayer’s victory was delivered by the district judge who had previously 
rebuffed hybrid removal efforts and had even awarded costs against another repeat defendant based on a 
finding that the filing of a hybrid removal was not “objectively reasonable.” See discussion of Robinson v. Pfizer, 
supra note 88. 
91 Jordan v. Bayer Corp., No. 4:17-CV-865 (CEJ), 2017 WL 3006993 (E.D. Mo. July 14, 2017); Ingham v. Johnson & 
Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-1857 SNLJ, 2017 WL 3034696 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2017); Livaudais v. Johnson & Johnson, 
No. 4:17-CV-1851 SNLJ, 2017 WL 3034701 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2017); Reppell v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-
1858 SNLJ, 2017 WL 3034707 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2017); Swann v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-1845 SNLJ, 
2017 WL 3034711 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2017); Siegfried v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 4:16 CV 
1942 CDP, 2017 WL 2778107 (E.D. Mo. June 27, 2017). 
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expanded use of specific jurisdiction as an alternative source of adjudicatory 
authority.  Subsequent actions by the Court — most notably the decision in Bristol-
Myers Squibb — have resolved much of that ambiguity, and federal judges therefore 
perceive it as much more straightforward to conclude that there is no basis for 
personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs bringing claims against out-of-state defendants 
based on out-of-state contacts.  The timing of Bayer’s first hybrid removal victory in 
the Eastern District of Missouri is therefore not coincidental.  The fifteen losses came 
before the Bristol-Myers Squibb decision; the first victory came less than a month 
after.       
Indeed, the influence of Bristol-Myers Squibb can be seen even more acutely 
in a series of five cases involving Bayer affiliates filed across the Mississippi River in 
the Southern District of Illinois.92  All five cases are essentially identical in their 
                                               
92 As explained here, each case resulted in two relevant opinions:  (1) Pirtle v. Janssen Research & Development, 
LLC, 2017 WL 2492663 (S.D. Ill. June 9, 2017), and Pirtle v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, 2017 WL 
4224036 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2017); (2) Bandy v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, 2017 WL 2492660 (S.D. Ill. 
June 9, 2017), and Bandy v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, 2017 WL 4224035 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2017); (3) 
Woodall v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, 2017 WL 2495410 (S.D. Ill. June 9, 2017), and Woodall v. 
Janssen Research & Development, LLC, 2017 WL 4237924 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2017); (4) Braun v. Janssen Research 
& Development, LLC, 2017 WL 2492662 (S.D. Ill. June 9, 2017), and Braun v. Janssen Research & Development, 
LLC, 2017 WL 4224034 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2017), and (5) Douthit v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, 2017 
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procedural history; Pirtle v. Janssen Research is illustrative.93  The complaint was filed 
in Illinois state court on March 16, 2017 by an Illinois plaintiff and a New Jersey 
plaintiff against numerous defendants with multiple citizenships that included New 
Jersey but not Illinois.94  On April 28, 2017, the defendants filed a notice of removal 
in the Southern District of Illinois.95  Defendants cited Ruhrgas and asked the federal 
court to first conclude that personal jurisdiction for the New Jersey plaintiff’s claim 
was lacking, and then to uphold the removal as to the remaining claim by the Illinois 
plaintiff.96  The court declined, and instead remanded the case back to state court 
on June 9, 2017 based on the lack of diversity on the face of the state court 
materials.97  Bristol Myers Squibb was decided a few weeks later, and the defendants 
                                                                                                                                                       
WL 2492661 (S.D. Ill. June 9, 2017), and Douthit v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, 2017 WL 4224031 
(S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2017). 
93 Pirtle, 2017 WL 2492663 at *1. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Remand at 6-10, Pirtle v. Janssen Research & 
Development, LLC, 2017 WL 6996738 (S.D. Ill. June 9, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-442-DRH). 
97 Pirtle, 2017 WL 2492663 at *3. 
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responded to the decision by filing a second notice of removal on July 19, 2017.98  
To justify the “re-removal,” the defendants characterized the BMS decision as an 
“order” or “other paper” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(3), meaning that its 
issuance triggered a new 30-day removal window.99  The district court accepted that 
statutory argument, invoked Ruhrgas to resequence jurisdictional decisions and 
dismiss the New Jersey claim, and denied the motion to remand as to the Illinois 
claim.100 
As these cases demonstrate, Bristol Myers Squibb is having a direct impact on 
the availability of hybrid removals in the federal district courts.  To be clear, that 
result is not required.  Even though it may now be simple to resolve hybrid removals 
by considering personal jurisdiction first, it remains equally simple (or at least nearly 
as simple) to resolve them by considering subject matter jurisdiction first. Ruhrgas 
permits federal judges to begin with personal jurisdiction when doing so would 
                                               
98 Second Notice of Removal, Pirtle v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-00442-DRH (S.D. Ill. 
June 9, 2017).   
99 Id. at *3. 
100 Pirtle, 2017 WL 4224036 at *3-6. 
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avoid a difficult subject matter jurisdiction analysis.  But when neither issue is 
difficult, judges are presented with an easy path to either a full remand or hybrid 
removal.  We might expect incentives related to caseload management to nudge 
federal courts toward returning cases to state court.101  Federal courts who are 
instead using their Ruhrgas discretion are doing so at least in part because they 
perceive that a remand will not actually result in any workload reduction.102  That is, 
if it is clear that the only impact of a remand will be the lengthen the amount of 
time it takes for a narrowed version of the case to make its way to federal court, 
then it hardly seems controversial to pursue the expedient result of achieving the 
same result immediately.103  Even so, as the next Part explains, further attention is 
warranted. 
 
                                               
101 Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy 
and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301, 306 (2011)(“given the reasonable assumption that judges tend to act 
in their self-interest, judges may too heavily weigh the first factor of minimizing workload”). 
102 See, e.g., Siegfried, 2017 WL 2778107 at *2 (“Remanding this case for lack of complete diversity, only to have 
the case removed again later once the non-Missouri plaintiffs are dismissed, would be a waste of judicial 
resources.”)  
103 Id.  The expediency being pursued here is not simply the result that produces the least federal effort, but is 
instead rooted in considerations of intersystemic efficiency.   
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III.  ASSESSING HYBRID REMOVAL   
Hybrid removal is an intentional strategy being deployed by defendants in 
complex cases, particularly those with multiple plaintiffs.  The judicial reception to 
this strategy has evolved with the jurisdictional doctrine, and especially since the 
decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb, the trend has moved strongly in the direction of 
acceptance of hybrid removal as a doctrine of expediency.  This part undertakes a 
critical analysis of the doctrine.  It concludes that there is no categorical argument 
against hybrid removal, and that it is a sensible and defensible procedural device in 
some circumstances.  Indeed, it is a superior procedural device to some others that 
have developed in response to persistent agitation by defendants, and it should be 
viewed going forward as the preferred vehicle for assessing whether removals 
should be sanctioned despite their facial nonconformity with the diversity statute.  
That said, there are limits to expediency, and hybrid removal should be resisted 
when concerns about judicial federalism are particularly acute. 
 
A.  Expediency and Doctrinal Fit 
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One complication with hybrid removal is that it overlaps with other doctrines 
that have developed over the years within the rubric of subject matter jurisdiction.  
The inclusion of stray plaintiffs or defendants who happen to destroy complete 
diversity is a time-honored practice used by plaintiffs who would prefer to litigate in 
state court.  Efforts by defendants to counter that practice are equally time-honored, 
and have given rise to two related but distinct doctrines. 
The first, fraudulent joinder, enjoys wide acceptance but limited 
applicability. 104   Defendants initially pressed this doctrine by pointing out the 
somewhat obvious nature of the litigation strategy being deployed by plaintiffs, and 
asked federal courts to intervene and permit removal when it was clear that the 
intent behind the structure of the suit was to secure a state court forum.  No federal 
court has been willing to go this far; to the contrary, all have concluded that 
questionable intent standing alone is insufficient to trigger the availability of 
removal.105  That said, defendants have been able to convince federal courts to 
                                               
104 See generally 14B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3723 n. 93-114. 
105 Wright & Miller, supra note 104, at § 3723 n. 94. 
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disregard non-diverse parties and permit removal in two situations:  (1) when the 
claim brought by or against the non-diverse party is clearly not colorable;106 and (2) 
when the jurisdictional facts pled by plaintiff reflect outright fraud.107 The burden is 
placed on the defendant to demonstrate the existence of one of these conditions by 
clear and convincing evidence,108 and it is met only rarely.109 
The second doctrine, procedural misjoinder,110 is an extension of the same 
theme.  The basic argument here is that the combination of the claims in a single 
action is deficient under the procedural joinder rules, notwithstanding the possibility 
                                               
106 Wright & Miller, supra note 104, at § 3723 n. 96 & 100; Mumfrey v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 719 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 
2013) (finding claim against non-diverse party was insufficient based on the pleadings, and denying remand as a 
result); Welk v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 720 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2013) (same); see also Smallwood v. Illinois Central 
Railroad Co., 385 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding no fraudulent joinder when non-colorable nature of claim 
applies to both non-diverse and diverse parties).   
107 Wright & Miller, supra note 104, at § 3723 n. 103.  
108 Wright & Miller, supra note 104, at § 3723 n. 105; Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 
2011)(applying a “clear and convincing evidence” standard). 
109 In part because of the difficulties meeting the high burden associated with fraudulent joinder doctrine as 
developed by the courts, legislative solutions that effectively lower the burden have been proposed from time to 
time.  See Hellman, supra note 72.   
110 There is some terminological inconsistency associated with this doctrine.  Some courts have referred to it as 
fraudulent misjoinder to indicate its connection with the fraudulent joinder doctrine.  See, e.g., In re c Products 
Liability Litigation, 591 F.3d 613, 620 (8th Cir. 2010).  But since the doctrine is not always based on any inquiry 
into motive or intent, the “fraudulent” label is misleading.  I will instead refer to the doctrine here as procedural 
misjoinder.  For a general discussion of the  
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that the claims being asserted are both colorable and devoid of outright fraud.111  
Most often, the procedural joinder issue relates to party joinder requirements that 
joined claims must share a transactional relationship and at least one common 
question of law or fact.112  If the claim brought by or against the non-diverse party 
are sufficiently unconnected, they may be disregarded for purposes of assessing the 
removal to federal court.  Some courts simply require a finding of misjoinder, while 
others require a showing that the misjoinder is egregious.113 
Procedural misjoinder in particular shares an affinity with hybrid removal.  
Both are ways of asserting that non-diverse parties are insufficiently connected with 
the rest of the suit, and that a facially non-removable case should be permitted to 
remain in federal court as a result.  In procedural misjoinder, the relevant lack of 
                                               
111 Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 436 F.3d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 2006)(“If these requirements are not met, 
joinder is improper even if there is no fraud in the pleadings and the plaintiff does have the ability to recover 
against each of the defendants.”).  
112  See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(requiring joined party claims to share a transactional relationship and a 
common question of law or fact); E. Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of It: Removing Civil Cases to Federal 
Court Based on Fraudulent Joinder,  91 IOWA L. REV. 189, 215-16 n. 105 (2005).  It is not obvious that federal 
joinder rules should provide the procedural requirements when assessing procedural misjoinder.  See infra notes 
124-127.  
113  See Laura J. Hines & Steven S. Gensler, Driving Misjoinder: The Improper Party Problem in Removal 
Jurisdiction, 57 ALA. L. REV. 779, 819-21 (2006) (collecting cases, and criticizing the egregiousness requirement).   
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connection is between the non-diverse claims and the other claims.  In hybrid 
removal, the relevant lack of connection is between the non-diverse claims and the 
forum state. To be sure, the overlap between these doctrines is not complete.114  But 
in the run of cases, these are two separate doctrines being invoked for the same 
reason and to achieve the same result. 
If procedural misjoinder is capable of addressing these cases, then what 
explains the rise of hybrid removal in the wake of Daimler and Bristol Myers Squibb?  
The answer to that lies in the sporadic embrace of procedural misjoinder in the 
federal courts.  The doctrine has been met with approval in some appellate 
circuits, 115  but has been rejected or ignored in others. In those districts where 
procedural misjoinder is unavailable or viewed with skepticism, hybrid removal is an 
exceedingly attractive alternative.  This helps to explain the persistence of its 
                                               
114 For example, if the plaintiffs sued where the defendant is “at home,” then personal jurisdiction for all claims 
would be unproblematic, and defendants would not be able to use hybrid removal as a strategy to move some 
claims to federal court.  But defendants might still argue that the claims brought by plaintiffs who share forum 
citizenship are insufficiently connected to the remaining claims as a matter of joinder. 
115 The seminal procedural misjoinder case is Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996), 
abrogated on other grounds by  Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000).  See also Crockett, 
436 F.3d at 533 (approving removal based on a finding of improper joinder); In re Prempro Products Liability 
Litigation, 591 F.3d 613 (8th Cir. 2010).   
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invocation in the Eastern District of Missouri and the Southern District of Illinois.  
The Eighth Circuit has not formally rejected fraudulent misjoinder, but its discussion 
of the doctrine has led district judges in the Eastern District of Missouri to interpret 
the doctrine extremely narrowly.116 The Seventh Circuit has said even less about the 
doctrine, leaving the district judges in the Southern District of Illinois free to reject it 
altogether.117  Conversely, in districts where procedural misjoinder is recognized, 
there is less need to press federal judges to embrace a new doctrine.  The Northern 
District of Texas provides an illustration.  The Fifth Circuit discussed the doctrine of 
procedural misjoinder approvingly as far back as 2002,118 and since then district 
                                               
116 See, e.g., Dickerson v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC, 2010 WL 2757339 (E.D. Mo. July 12, 2010)(remanding because 
misjoinder was not egregious); Hines v. Bayer Corp., 2017 WL 2535709 (E.D. Mo. June 12, 2017)(same).  These 
results flow from the Eight Circuit’s opinion in In re Prempro, 591 F.3d 613, which suggested that the fraudulent 
misjoinder doctrine would require “a level of misjoinder that was not only improper, but grossly improper.” Id. at 
624; see also id. (fraudulent misjoinder not relevant “absent evidence that plaintiffs’ misjoinder borders on a 
‘sham’”).   
117  See, e.g., Rutherford v. Merck & Co., 428 F.Supp.2d 842, 851 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (characterizing fraudulent 
misjoinder as an “improper expansion of the scope of federal diversity jurisdiction by the federal courts”); Abel v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2013 WL 5835404 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2013) (noting the rejection of the fraudulent 
misjoinder doctrine by numerous judges in the district). The hostility toward procedural misjoinder informs a 
hybrid removal analysis because it makes the subject matter jurisdiction inquiry even more straightforward.   
118 In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626 (5th Cir. 2002).  In Benjamin Moore, the Fifth Circuit concluded 
that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order, but its opinion contained language 
indicating support for the concept of procedural misjoinder.  This followed an earlier opinion in the same case 
in which the court denied a writ of mandamus, but noted that “it might be concluded that misjoinder of 
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courts in the Northern District of Texas have entertained arguments that removal 
should be upheld on that basis.  That was true before the Supreme Court’s recent 
personal jurisdiction activity, and tellingly it remains true even after. 
The result of all of this is doctrinal confusion.  Both doctrines can support a 
defendant’s goal of achieving a partial removal to federal court in a single step.   
But in some districts, procedural misjoinder is entrenched and hybrid removal is 
unnecessary, while in others, procedural misjoinder is disfavored and hybrid removal 
has emerged as an attractive new argument.  This confusion should be resolved by 
permitting the doctrine of hybrid removal to displace procedural misjoinder.119 The 
primary reason for this relates to the fit between the actual argument being made 
by defendants and the doctrine being employed.  When defendants resist the filing 
of a multi-plaintiff against them in a disfavored forum, the basis for their resistance 
has more to do with the location of the suit rather than its structure.  Personal 
                                                                                                                                                       
plaintiffs should not be allowed to defeat diversity jurisdiction.” In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 309 F.3d 296 (5th 
Cir. 2002).  See also Crockett, 436 F.3d 529. 
119 This is based on an acknowledgement - but not necessarily an endorsement - of those developments.  For 
better or worse, the Supreme Court is unlikely to rethink its current approach to personal jurisdiction anytime 
soon.  See Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301, 1305 
(2014). 
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jurisdiction, of course, relates to location, and so it more closely tracks the concern 
being raised.  Hybrid removal also avoids difficult questions about intent.  Courts 
applying procedural misjoinder have struggled to define what must be shown in 
order to trigger severance and partial removal, and many have required that 
defendants demonstrate that the misjoinder at issue is “egregious” or “a sham.”120  
Part of the reason for this confusion is the perceived relationship between 
procedural misjoinder and fraudulent joinder.121  Hybrid removal carries no such 
doctrinal baggage, and requires no attempt to discern the motivation of the 
litigants.     
A final reason relates to choice of law.  There is a complicated but under-
appreciated choice of law question embedded in the procedural misjoinder doctrine.  
When assessing whether parties have been properly joined to the suit (and therefore 
whether they should be considered for removal purposes), should the court apply 
the federal joinder rules or the joinder rules of the state where the case was filed?  
                                               
120 See supra note 113.  
121 Hines & Gensler, supra note 113, at 819 (tracing the undue influence of fraudulent joinder on procedural 
misjoinder analysis). 
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Courts who have applied the doctrine have not answered this question uniformly,122 
and most courts have not really addressed the issue directly.123  Scholarly attention 
to the matter has been limited.  Gensler and Hines have suggested that federal 
courts ought to favor the application of federal joinder rules, not as a matter of a 
Rules Enabling Act command, but to better serve the policy goal of policing 
strategic behavior on the part of plaintiffs.124   It is not obvious why the removal 
statute, which is explicitly rooted in subject matter jurisdiction, should be read to 
deprive plaintiffs of the availability of state procedural rules related to joinder.125  
The removal statute is without question designed to vindicate policy goals, some of 
which relate to the protection of defendants, but even so its application has 
traditionally been tempered by the traditional deference to a plaintiff’s choice of 
forum, which is partially embodied in the maxim that the statute should be 
                                               
122 Compare Coleman v. Conseco, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d 804, 815-16 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (applying federal joinder 
rules) with Conk v. Richards & O’Neil, LLP, 77 F.Supp.2d 956, 971 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (applying state joinder rules). 
123 See Hines & Gensler, supra note 113, at 812 (2006) (noting that some of the foundational decisions on 
procedural misjoinder said little or nothing on the choice of law question). 
124 Id. at 817. 
125 Id. at 815 (“Whether the state thinks the party structure is acceptable is wholly beside the point.”).   
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interpreted narrowly.126  A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  The relevant point is that the doctrine of hybrid removal avoids these 
complications.  Thanks to the command of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
there is no question that a federal court must analyze personal jurisdiction using the 
same analysis that the state court would use.127  Hybrid removal thus does not 
represent any expansion in the scope of removability; rather, it merely facilitates 
expeditious consideration of personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction in a 
single inquiry. 
                                               
126 See, e.g., Gasch v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2007) (invoking federalism 
to support the proposition that “[t]he removal statute is therefore to be strictly construed, and any doubt about 
the propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand”); Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 
29 (“the removal statute should be strictly construed and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand”) 
(citing 14 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3642). 
127 There are a few slight exceptions to this general approach to personal jurisdiction in the federal courts.  First, 
in cases involving parties joined under Rule 14 or 19, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(B) extends the scope of personal 
jurisdiction 100 miles from the federal courthouse, regardless of state borders.  Second, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C) 
allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction when authorized by a federal statute, and Congress has passed 
statutes permitting nationwide service of process in limited contexts.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 2361 
(interpleader); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1369(a), 1697 (mass torts); Jonathan R. Nash, National Personal Jurisdiction (SSRN 
draft) at 14-15 (discussing these and others).  The other current extension of personal jurisdiction in federal 
courts, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), is not relevant to this discussion because it applies only to federal question cases.  
In response to the recent changes in personal jurisdiction doctrine, however, some commentators have 
proposed modifications to this rule to expand the scope of federal personal jurisdiction in diversity cases.  See 
id; Borchers, supra note 21; Aaron D. Simowitz, Legislating Transnational Jurisdiction, __ VA. J. INT’L. L. __ 
(forthcoming).   
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B.  Federalism and Restraint 
Even though it has some advantages over existing doctrines, and even though 
it may promote judicial efficiency, hybrid removal should be not available as a 
procedural mechanism in every case.  Instead, principles of judicial federalism will 
often caution in favor of restraint.  This section explains the reasons why restraint is 
warranted, and the next section develops an account of how that restraint should 
operate in practice.  Concerns about judicial federalism led some federal appellate 
courts to adopt the firm rules regarding the primacy of subject matter jurisdiction 
that were at issue in Ruhrgas.128  It must of course be noted that the United States 
Supreme Court concluded that such inflexible rules were unwarranted.  In reaching 
that conclusion, however, the Court cautioned that “a State’s dignitary interest bears 
consideration when a district court exercises discretion in a case of this order.”129 In 
other words, the power to resequence jurisdictional decisions is not absolute, and 
                                               
128 Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev’d, 526 U.S. 574 (1999).  
129 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 586 (1999).  
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should be informed not just by the interests of the federal courts, but also by the 
countervailing interests of the state courts. 
Much of the discussion of Ruhrgas has revolved around how far its 
resequencing power extends, or about how and where to draw the line between 
Ruhrgas and the constraint imposed by the predecessor case Steel Co v. Citizens for 
a Better Environment. 130  These discussions have not produced a uniform 
understanding, but central to the defense of some form of resequencing has been 
the recognition that it operates as a limitation on the exercise of federal judicial 
power.  The federal court may be deciding “threshold” or “non-merits” issues in a 
manner that carries some preclusive effect,131 but it is doing so in the service of 
declining adjudicative power over the merits of the claim.  As a result, the power 
                                               
130 523 U.S. 83 (1998)(holding that a federal court could not reach the merits of a claim without first establishing 
subject matter jurisdiction).  For discussions of the scope and contours of Ruhrgas, see Scott C. Idleman, The 
Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2001); Michael J. Edney, 
Preclusive Abstention: Issue Preclusion and Jurisdictional Dismissals after Ruhrgas, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 193 (2001); 
Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy 
and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301 (2011); Alan M. Trammell, Jurisdictional Sequencing, 47 GA. L. REV. 
1099 (2013). 
131 For discussions of the preclusive effects of federal decisions on threshold issues made pursuant to Ruhrgas, 
see Edney, supra note 130; Clermont, supra note 130; Trammell, supra note 130 
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recognized by Ruhrgas has generally been characterized as a power to dismiss,132 
and the use of that power has been viewed as consistent with principles of judicial 
restraint and judicial federalism.133   
Like Ruhrgas, hybrid removal involves the interaction between subject matter 
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, and it is in that sense unremarkable.  That said, 
hybrid removal is remarkable in the sense that it does not culminate in the dismissal 
of the case before the federal court.  Rather, certain claims are dismissed, but the 
court then asserts power to decide remaining claims on the merits.  Hybrid removal 
thus presents a significantly different context for the application of Ruhrgas:  
resequencing to support the assertion of adjudicative power rather than mere 
                                               
132 See, e.g., Trammell, supra note 130, at 1101 (describing the doctrine as “the ability to dismiss a case on 
easier grounds before taking up harder jurisdictional questions”); Clermont, supra note 130, at 309 (Ruhrgas 
“allows courts to avoid decision on subject-matter jurisdiction by hypothesizing its existence in order to dismiss 
on other threshold grounds with a binding effect”).  That framing is supported, if perhaps not required, by 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Ruhrgas, which speaks most often in terms of flexibility to choose among different 
pre-merits paths to dismissal.  526 U.S. at 1570 (“It is hardly novel for a federal court to choose among 
threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.”).  It is also consistent with the petition for 
certiorari, which described the issue as “’[w]hether a federal district court is absolutely barred in all 
circumstances from dismissing a removed case for lack of personal jurisdiction without first deciding its subject-
matter jurisdiction.’”  Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578 (1999) (quoting petition for certiorari). 
133 Heather Elliott, Jurisdictional Resequencing and Restraint, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 725 (2009); Trammell, supra 
note 130, at 1143 (“Dismissals on the basis of an allocative rule do not arrogate new powers to the federal 
courts.”).  
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dismissal.  When a federal court assumes power to declare law 134  (or, in Alan 
Trammell’s phrasing, to create conduct rules135), the potential for intrusion on the 
dignitary interests of the states is significant.  Reliance on expediency alone is 
therefore insufficient; instead, special attention must be paid to ensure that hybrid 
removal does not encroach on the domain of the state courts.          
 
C.  Striking the Balance 
The argument thus far suggests that hybrid removal presents an appealing 
doctrinal fit for the concerns being pressed by defendants in many removal cases, 
but that restraint is warranted.  This part elaborates on how that restraint might 
operate.  Federal judges should entertain hybrid removals only when they are 
convinced that doing so is consistent with both pragmatism and federalism.  In 
practice, this is most likely to be the case when the jurisdictional facts pled by the 
plaintiff are flatly inconsistent with the constitutional exercise of personal jurisdiction 
                                               
134 Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584-85 (“a court that dismisses on . . . non-merits grounds [. . .] makes no assumption of 
law-declaring power”) (citing In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
135 Trammell, supra note 130, at 1137-38. 
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over some claims in the suit.  On the other hand, when the analysis of jurisdiction 
would require the federal court to pierce the pleadings or grapple with issues of 
state law, remand is warranted. 
One of the first successful hybrid removals in the Eastern District of Missouri 
helps to illustrate both sides of this standard.  In Jordan v. Bayer, the plaintiffs filed a 
complaint that contained claims by 94 plaintiffs against Bayer and four affiliated 
entities.136  Only eight plaintiffs pled facts connecting their claims to the forum state 
of Missouri. 137   The remaining 86 plaintiffs were from an assortment of other 
states, 138  and all of the specific allegations relating to those plaintiffs occurred 
outside of the forum state.139  Thus, the only forum connection for those claims was 
the general business activity of the defendant in the state.140  After Daimler and 
                                               
136 Jordan v. Bayer, 2017 WL 3006993 at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 14, 2017).  This case is one of a number of cases filed 
against Bayer in Missouri arising from injuries allegedly caused by the Essure medical device.  See supra notes 
89-91. 
137 Id.  Seven plaintiffs were Missouri residents who had the Essure device implanted in Missouri and suffered 
injuries there; another was an Illinois resident who had the Essure device implanted in Missouri. 
138  Id.  These other states overlapped with the corporate citizenship of the defendants, which rendered the case 
non-removable on its face. 
139  Id. at *4. 
140 Including of course the activity of selling the device to the seven Missouri plaintiffs. 
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Bristol Myers Squibb, there can be no question that such activity is insufficient to 
support the constitutional exercise of personal jurisdiction, and so the plaintiff’s own 
allegations revealed a fundamental and inescapable defect.141  This is a paradigm 
case for hybrid removal, and the district court’s decision to permit it was perfectly 
sensible.142 
The plaintiffs in Jordan filed an amended complaint, and then sought 
reconsideration of the hybrid removal order.143  To support their reconsideration 
request, plaintiffs relied on new factual allegations that the defendant had targeted 
the forum state as “ground zero” for its development of the medical device in 
question.  These factual allegations include details about clinical trials conducted by 
                                               
141 The strength of this conclusion was bolstered by a Missouri Supreme Court opinion, decided prior to Bristol-
Myers Squibb, that held that specific jurisdiction could not be based on allegations that the defendant engaged 
in the same “type” of activity that gave rise to the plaintiff’s claim.  State ex rel. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. 
Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41, 49 (Mo. 2017).  Dolan also decided that the Missouri business registration statute did not 
confer consent to jurisdiction. Id. at 51-52. 
142 But see Hamby v. Bayer, Corp., 2017 WL 3327593 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2017) (denying hybrid removal and 
remanding in a similar case); Rios v. Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals, 2017 WL 3600374 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2017) 
(same).  
143 For procedural history of the case, see Jordan v. Bayer Corp., 2018 WL 339305 at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 
2018)(denying reconsideration and granting leave to file amended complaint); Jordan v. Bayer Corp., 2018 WL 
837700 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2018) at *1-2 (denying motion to remand based on amended complaint).  In between 
the filing of the original complaint and the consideration of the amended complaint, the case was also 
transferred to a new judge due to the retirement of the judge who entered the original hybrid removal order. 
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doctors and at hospitals within the state,144 and the central role of the St. Louis area 
in the overall marketing of the device.145 Taken together, the plaintiffs argued that 
these intentional connections with the state created a sufficient link to create specific 
jurisdiction with respect to all claims arising from the eventual use of the device.146  
The district court initially denied reconsideration on technical grounds — the new 
allegations appeared in an amended complaint that was filed without leave — but 
the plaintiffs were permitted to file the amended complaint and pursue remand.147   
Even after Bristol-Myers Squibb, the amended complaint presents a more 
uncertain jurisdictional case than the original complaint at issue in Jordan.  The new 
facts pled in Jordan were explicitly designed to respond directly to Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, which noted that that the defendants did not develop the drug at issue in 
                                               
144 Amended Petition for Damages at ¶ 170 C-H, Jordan v. Bayer Corp., 2018 WL 339305 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2018) 
(No. 4:17-cv-00865), 2017 WL 5563904 (detailing clinical trials). 
145 Id. at ¶ 170 I-J (detailing marketing plan). 
146 Id. at ¶ 169 (“There is ‘specific’ jurisdiction, because Defendants used St. Louis, Missouri, to develop, create a 
marketing strategy for, label, or work on the regulatory approval, for Essure, and all of the Plaintiffs’ claims arise 
out of or relate to the Defendants’ contacts with Missouri.”).  
147 Jordan, 2018 WL 339305 at *2. 
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California or create a marketing strategy there.148 According to the plaintiffs, those 
concerns provide a “blueprint” for how to properly establish specific jurisdiction in 
these types of cases.149  One way of resolving this uncertainty is to conclude that 
this understanding of Bristol-Myers Squibb is misguided, and that these sorts of 
allegations are legally insufficient.  This resolution requires more than simply 
applying the core holding of Bristol-Myers Squibb.  Instead, it requires a decision 
about how far that core holding extends, and courts facing similar decisions have 
produced results that are far from uniform.150  Even so, the question at issue rests 
entirely on federal law and can be decided on the face of the complaint.  Permitting 
a hybrid removal on this basis does not present any serious intrusion upon the 
domain of the state courts.151  Alternatively, the source of uncertainty may derive 
not just from legal ambiguity as to what sort of connection is necessary to support 
                                               
148 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1778. 
149 Jordan, 2018 WL 837700 at *4.   
150 See cases discussed supra notes 43-44. 
151 On February 13, 2017, the district judge in Jordan decided the renewed motion by deciding that the new 
allegations in the amended complaint remain “too attenuated to serve as a basis for specific jurisdiction over 
Bayer.” Jordan, 2018 WL 837700 at *4.  On that basis, the non-Missouri plaintiffs were dismissed from the suit, 
and the removal as to the remaining parties was then upheld based on complete diversity. 
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jurisdiction, but also from factual ambiguity about the actual connection that existed 
between the defendant and the forum state.  If the jurisdictional inquiry is contested 
and factually-bound, the federal court should hesitate to wade too far into the 
consideration of a hybrid removal request.  To do so is to take on a complex inquiry 
unnecessarily, one that might easily bleed into a consideration of issues that run to 
the merits. 152   Meanwhile, the analysis of subject matter jurisdiction remains 
straightforward, and indeed is even more so if procedural misjoinder arguments are 
no longer considered.153   In this situation, then, remand is the expedient outcome. It 
is also an outcome that respects the domain of state courts while preserving the 
availability of a federal forum should the facts ultimately show an insufficient 
connection to sustain jurisdiction.      
The approach suggested by these two cases mirrors the development of 
fraudulent joinder doctrine in the federal courts.  Despite requests to peek through 
                                               
152 For a discussion of how the resolution of personal jurisdictional issues may inevitably affect the merits of the 
underlying claims, see Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Inextricable Merits Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 45 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1301 (2012). 
153 See discussion supra notes 119-127. 
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the pleadings and assess the underlying motivations behind a particular case 
structure, the federal courts have generally confined their analysis to the face of the 
pleadings and have dismissed claims (and thereby disregarded non-diverse parties) 
only when the allegations as pled reveal no possibility of relief.154  Similarly, when a 
hybrid removal is presented, federal courts should only dismiss claims (and thereby 
disregard non-diverse parties) when the allegations as pled reveal no possibility of 
proper jurisdiction.  Such an approach has the benefit of creating a symmetry 
between the two doctrines, but more importantly it strikes a fair balance between 
considerations of expediency and federalism.    
As discussed in Part II, plaintiffs developed several nascent strategies to 
combat the impact of Goodyear and Daimler and protect their preferred forum and 
case structure.155  Today, there are two primary survivors: pleading jurisdictional facts 
that link the development of the product in question to the state, and using a 
state’s business registration statute as grounds for consent to jurisdiction.  Both of 
                                               
154 See supra notes 105-106. 
155 See supra Part II. 
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these push against the broad use of hybrid removal.  In terms of the first, plaintiffs 
are searching for in-state activity by the defendant that can be used to provide a 
jurisdictional hook for claims brought by out-of-state plaintiffs.  After Daimler, of 
course, general sales of products in the state are insufficient; instead, plaintiffs must 
articulate an argument that the claims asserted “arise out of” the identified activities.  
The amended complaint in Jordan reflects this trend in the pleading of complex 
cases,156 and complaints following this trend are not good candidates for hybrid 
removal, at least insofar as they requirement development of jurisdictional facts.  
The same can be said for complaints pursuing the second jurisdictional strategy just 
described.  Plaintiffs pursuing a consent strategy must rely on the state’s business 
registration statute, and the jurisdictional question will therefore often involve a 
consequential interpretation of state law.157  Initially, at least, federal courts should 
                                               
156 See supra notes 143-153.   
157 See discussion supra notes 53-60. 
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permit state court judges to make those interpretations, and remand provides an 
excellent vehicle for that kind of intersystemic judicial deference.158     
D.  Distrust  
What will happen if plaintiffs adapt to the new jurisdictional reality and begin 
pleading in accordance with the strategies just discussed?  Remands should become 
more frequent, leaving plaintiffs and defendants to determine the structure of the 
suit — and ultimately its location — by litigating jurisdictional facts in state court.  
Formally, this is a neutral result that merely affects the sequencing and location of 
jurisdictional decisions.  And yet it is unlikely to be a result that defendants will 
embrace.  The reason for that reveals a troubling source of the jurisdictional 
gamesmanship underlying these cases:  defendants are interested not just in where 
they will litigate the ultimate merits of the claims lodged against them, but also in 
where they will litigate the jurisdictional issues associated with those claims.  This is 
                                               
158 I say “initially” here because once the statute has been given a definitive interpretation by the state, the need 
for deference may diminish.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41 (Mo. 
2017) (concluding that a state business registration does not establish consent to jurisdiction); Genuine Parts Co. 
v. Cepec 137 A.3d 123 (Del. 2016) (same). Similarly, if a federal court were to conclude that business registration 
statutes cannot be interpreted consistent with federal due process to extract broad consent to jurisdiction, then 
the question becomes one of federal law and hybrid removal again becomes appropriate.   
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true despite the fact that the jurisdictional standards to be applied are generally 
insensitive to location.159  Put differently, defendants’ concern with location is not 
about what standards will apply, but who will apply them. 
Although defendants may frame their requests for hybrid removal in terms of 
expediency, the real underlying motivation is often a judgment that federal courts 
are more likely to be receptive to their personal jurisdiction arguments. This may be 
attributable to a general sense that state judges are more inclined to favor the 
exercise of adjudicative authority relative to federal courts.  Empirical data on this 
question is relatively sparse, but lends some modest support for the proposition that 
federal judges may be more likely to enter personal jurisdiction dismissals.160  A 
related explanation is a more specific concern that state judges may be resistant to 
enter personal jurisdiction dismissals in these types of cases.  The federal districts 
that have seen a pattern of hybrid removals tend to overlap with state court 
                                               
159 See supra note 127. 
160 Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1, 51-53 (1998). 
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jurisdictions considered by defendants as “judicial hellholes.”161  That is relevant for 
two reasons.  First, the reputations earned by these districts is presumably 
attributable to the behavior of both juries and judges, and so the particular judges 
involved may be perceived to be systematically pro-plaintiff. More controversially, 
the fact that these jurisdictions have positioned themselves as hospitable forums for 
the litigation of nationwide products liability cases has created a lot of legal 
business.  Many lawyers — and many judges — are supported by the steady filing 
of cases, and the restriction of the scope of personal jurisdiction therefore 
constitutes a significant threat to the status quo.  To the extent that the judges 
themselves are motivated to preserve that status quo, they may seek to undermine 
that threat through narrow interpretation or outright defiance.  In short, what 
underlies much of the hybrid removal activity that has been observed recently may 
be a lack of trust in the willingness of state court judges to fully implement the 
Supreme Court’s recent personal jurisdiction decisions.   
                                               
161 http://www.judicialhellholes.org/2017-2018/executive-summary/ (identifying St. Louis, Missouri and Madison 
County, Illinois as “judicial hellholes”). 
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Distrust is a provocative hypothesis to explain the rise of hybrid removals, but 
it is also a vexing one.  To begin, it is difficult to prove.  Lawyers involved in these 
cases may speak casually about their motivations and strategies, but are not eager 
to do so formally.  There are hints – prior to Bristol-Myers Squibb, why would Bayer 
continue to file hybrid removals given their paltry record of success? – but little that 
rises beyond conjecture.  Moreover, even if proof for the hypothesis existed, it is not 
clear that it should have any implications for the doctrinal analysis explored here.  
To be sure, there are recognized doctrines that make federal courts available based 
on concerns about the ability of state courts to provide a neutral forum for the 
adjudication of particular disputes.  And it should be noted that the removal statute 
itself may be viewed as one of those doctrines.  Even so, those doctrines are 
responsive to systemic concerns rather than individualized suspicions.  For that 
reason, distrust as an underlying motivation should play no role in the case-by-case 
determination of whether a hybrid removal should be granted.     
 
CONCLUSION 
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The jurisdictional landscape has shifted in recent years, and litigation strategy 
is shifting in response.  Defendants now have tools that can be leveraged to 
frustrate the plaintiff’s choice of forum and preferred party structure. This Article has 
described those tools, but has also focused on a particular way that those tools are 
being deployed.  Hybrid removal is a direct if unintended consequence of our 
ongoing jurisdictional revolution.  In limited circumstances, it may have a useful role 
in promoting intersystemic expediency, but it should properly be viewed as an 
exception to the general approach to removability.  
